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Pre-Print Excerpt from Disarmament Diplomacy 91     (Publication date 8 September 2009)
NUCLEAR TESTING AND PROLIFERATION – AN 

INEXTRICABLE CONNECTION
 
Thomas Graham, Jr. and David Hafemeister
To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my Administration will immediately and aggressively
pursue US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of
talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned.
President Barack Obama, Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April, 2009.
I will begin working to build the necessary bipartisan support for US ratification of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ... success would be the single greatest arms control
accomplishment for the new Senate and it would reestablish America’s traditional leadership role
on nonproliferation.
Senator John Kerry, Chair, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Boston Globe, 13 January, 2009. 
President Obama’s call in Prague to complete the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
was widely praised on the global stage.  But what
will be entailed for the United States to ratify the 
CTBT and reinvigorate international efforts to secure
the remaining signatures and ratifications so that the 
Treaty can at last enter into force?
When deciding whether to vote for or against
international treaties and agreements, Senators need 
to consider the net benefit of that treaty for the
United States.  In other words, considering all 
aspects, on balance is the United States’ national 
security increased by ratifying the treaty or is it
diminished?  Senators should evaluate the totality of
the treaty and assess the answers to a range of 
questions, such as the following: If US nuclear
testing was followed by Chinese and Russian nuclear
tests, would this likely diminish US security?  Are 
US nuclear forces diminished by relying on the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program as compared to 
nuclear testing? If so, is it significant for the 
different warhead types in the enduring stockpile? 
What are the missions for US nuclear warheads and
which of these have extremely high demands for
weapons reliability?  How much are US monitoring 
capabilities enhanced with the CTBT International
Monitoring System (IMS) in place?  Can the US
obtain on-site inspection access without a CTBT? Is 
the nuclear nonproliferation regime stronger and
better off with or without the CTBT? 
This article addresses these important questions
and provides an up-to-date political and technical
analysis of the CTBT and its role in US security and 
nuclear nonproliferation policy. 
First we need to recall what happened last time
the CTBT came before the Senate, and consider the 
consequences of the Senate vote against CTBT 
ratification on 13 October, 1999. Ratification was 
defeated by 48 votes to 51, falling far short of the
necessary two-thirds Senate majority. This vote was 
forced prematurely after a curtailed debate by 
Senator Jesse Helms (Republican, North Carolina), 
then Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, citing procedural grounds. This was
most unfortunate, as the treaty fell victim to partisan 
politics in the Senate which was bitterly divided 
along party lines at the time over issues unrelated to
the CTBT’s subject matter and content.  Before the 
vote, 62 Senators (24 Republicans and 38
Democrats) had circulated a letter sponsored by
Senators John Warner (Republican, Virginia) and 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Democrat, New York), 
calling on Majority Leader Trent Lott (Republican,
Mississippi) and Minority Leader Tom Daschle
(Democrat, South Dakota) to halt the vote, since they 
feared that the CTBT would not be considered on its 
own merits.
Describing the 1999 ratification debacle in detail 
in Foreign Affairs, Terry Deibel concludes: 
“Looking back, the Senate’s defeat of the CTBT may 
well have been a turning point in American statecraft 
if not in world politics, marking at least a setback for
efforts to regulate weapons through detailed arms
control treaties, and possibly their end.  The Senate’s 
action also may have been a watershed in the politics 
of American foreign policy, for the treaty’s failure
was an important triumph for unilateralism – a 
conservative strain of Republican thought that now
struggles for control of George W. Bush’s foreign 
policy against the cooperative internationalism that 
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was the hallmark of his father’s administration.”1 
A decade has lapsed since that defeat. In the 
United States – and elsewhere – we are now seeing 
the CTBT rise from its long coma because it makes 
such good sense for nuclear safety and stability. This 
multilateral treaty bans all nuclear explosions of any 
yield in all places for all time.  The CTBT is an arms
control measure that constrains the nuclear weapon 
states (NWS) from testing new or old types of
nuclear weapons. It stops new big weapons, such as 
thermonuclear weapons and it stops the development 
of most small battle-field weapons.  The CTBT is
also a nonproliferation measure that constrains non
nuclear weapon states (NNWS) by raising an almost 
universally-adopted barrier to stop nuclear testing 
and to support the fundamental security regime
based around the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT).  
Such a barrier would not completely prevent the 
development of simple weapons, such as uranium
gun-type weapons and primitive plutonium-
implosion weapons, but the CTBT makes it more 
difficult to design warheads for more sophisticated
weapons and delivery systems and sets a global norm
against developing new nuclear weapons. The 
United States has considerable experience and data 
from its 1,039 tests, more than Russia at 718 tests,
France (198), China (45), United Kingdom (45),
India (6), Pakistan (6) and North Korea (2).2  At the
time of writing, the CTBT has 181 signatories, of
which 149 have ratified; and 35 of the 44 nuclear
capable states listed in Treaty Annex 2, required for
entry into force have ratified. The principal outliers
among nuclear weapon capable states are the United
States, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North 
Korea. In addition, Iran, Egypt and Indonesia have
signed but not yet ratified. 
China and Israel are waiting for the United States. 
India was ready to ratify in 1999 before the US 
Senate voted against the CTBT and let them off the 
hook. If India acts, Pakistan will follow. And surely 
diplomacy can find a way with North Korea. For 
comparison sake, the United Nations has 191 
members, the NPT has 189 states parties, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has 
146 members (February 2009) with some 155 states 
under safeguards.
CTBT and NPT inextricably linked
The international commitment to end nuclear
testing has been enshrined in the NPT since its 
conclusion in 1968.  The most important treaty for 
international peace and security that exists, the NPT
was built on a basic bargain. The overwhelming
majority of countries agreed to join the treaty as non 
nuclear weapon states, not to acquire nuclear
weapons and to allow inspections of their nuclear
facilities. In return, the five states that possessed 
nuclear weapons at the time of treaty signing in 1968 
were allowed to join the NPT as recognized nuclear 
weapon states, but in return they pledged to negotiate
the elimination of their nuclear arsenals and 
promised not to impede the sharing of peaceful 
nuclear technology with the NNWS.  Interim steps 
toward nuclear disarmament in the nearer future
were also to be negotiated. When the NPT was 
signed in 1968, these interim steps were understood
to include: a permanent ban on all nuclear explosive 
tests, a treaty halting the further production of 
nuclear weapon explosive material, deep reductions 
in nuclear weapons, and legally binding
commitments never to use nuclear weapons against 
NPT non nuclear weapon states. Upon this basic 
bargain was the NPT built. Observing the bargain is 
essential to the health of the treaty regime. But the 
most important element of the NPT bargain was and 
is the commitment to ban all nuclear testing. 
It was recognized at the time of the signing of the
NPT that the total elimination of all the nuclear
weapon arsenals was likely to be far in the future.
But the NPT was a strategic bargain; it was not a gift 
from the non nuclear weapon states.  Thus, if they 
were going to give up the possession of this ultimate 
weapon, at least, they agreed, the NWS could in the 
nearer future take the step of halting nuclear weapon 
tests. From the earliest of days the NNWS saw the 
test ban as the litmus test of NWS compliance with
this basic bargain of the treaty. The test ban is the
only interim measure explicitly mentioned in the
Treaty. The discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests 
is called for in preambular paragraph 10 of the NPT. 
Without the CTBT, the NPT is not seen by most of 
the world as a treaty of balanced obligations. A one-
sided NPT will not survive forever.
The NPT is currently under severe stress as a 
result of diverse problems, including: North Korea’s 
nuclear weapon and missile programmes; Iran’s 
uranium enrichment programme; Pakistan’s A.Q. 
Kahn’s nuclear Wal-Mart; the Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear weapon programmes and tests; the large 
Israeli nuclear arsenal outside the treaty; the nuclear
flirtations by Syria and others; and concerns by states
living in troubled neighbourhoods that proliferation
might cascade.  The NPT doesn’t solve everything; it 
cannot constrain the potential misuse of nuclear fuel
cycles for energy production, for example, but 
without the NPT this issue cannot even be addressed.
It is obvious that the United States does not have the 
ability to address these issues by itself.  Unilateral
US efforts to stem global proliferation are bound to
fail; only with the expanded clout of nations working 
together is there a chance to succeed.
Because of its contribution to the prevention of
future nuclear arms races and its importance to the
NPT regime, there is no significant international
Disarmament Diplomacy  91 16 Summer  2009
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
   
 
   
  
  
 
 
    
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
   
  
  
   
 
 
  
  
   
  
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
     
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
   
  
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
  
issue today with greater consensus than the CTBT.
In December 2008 the United Nations General 
Assembly voted a laudatory CTBT resolution by 175
in favour, versus one in opposition (the United
States) with three abstentions (India, Mauritius and
Syria). If one totalled up the numerous votes in the 
UN regarding the test ban over the past six years, the 
total vote count would be 1,045 in favour to 8
against (6 US votes, 1 North Korea, 1 Palau).3 This
is not where the United States should be. Since 
President Obama favours the CTBT, it is generally
assumed there will be no negative vote by the US
next December when the UN addresses this issue 
again. Thus, CTBT has gone from near death to a 
hopeful resurrection. 
The near-death of the CTBT is perplexing when 
one considers its importance to the global 
nonproliferation regime. What the constitution is to
the United States, the NPT is to proliferation 
prevention.  The NPT is the best that we have, with 
nothing on the horizon to replace it.  It entered into
force in 1970 with a then lifetime of 25 years.  
In the late 1960s when the NPT was negotiated in 
Geneva, most delegations intended to provide that
the NPT would be a permanent treaty as is the 
custom with multilateral arms control treaties. 
However, three delegations – Sweden, Germany and 
Italy – opposed this, on the grounds that the treaty’s 
future was uncertain and the commercial impact of
the safeguards could not be determined. The
compromise reached was set out in the NPT’s Article 
X: that the initial period of the Treaty would be for
25 years and after this period there would be a 
conference of the states parties at which, by majority
vote, they would decide whether to make the treaty
permanent or extend it for a fixed period or periods.
This decision was delegated to the 1995 Review
Conference by the treaty text and, thus, on a one-
time basis an extension of the Treaty could be agreed
and become effective without reference to national
legislatures. Any subsequent extension would have
had to be made by Treaty amendment. This would
have been an impossibility given the arduous
amendment process provided by the Treaty and the
very large number of national legislatures that would 
have to approve it. In effect, therefore, the 1995 
Conference was the only opportunity to make the 
NPT permanent. 
In advance of the 1995 decision, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France and Russia, all 
NPT nuclear weapon states, plus Germany and
greatly assisted by allies such as Japan and Australia,
worked mightily to renew the NPT without a time-
limit, in perpetuity, for forever. The other NPT 
nuclear weapon state, China, took a moderately
supportive position. However, many of the then 173 
(now 184) NPT non-nuclear weapon states had other 
ideas in mind. They were concerned that if the
Treaty were made permanent, they would lose all 
leverage over the NWS to fulfil the disarmament 
obligations in the NPT basic bargain, as reflected in
Article VI of the treaty.  In 1995, Article VI lay 
largely unimplemented with the absence of a test ban 
as the most important example.
One of the authors of this article (Thomas 
Graham) represented the United States as the 
Ambassador for Nonproliferation and Arms Control,
and during 1993-1995 travelled to the capitals of 47 
NPT parties, returning to some of them many times 
(seven trips to Egypt, for example), to remind other
governments of the importance of the NPT for their
particular neighbourhoods and for global stability,
and to urge that they support indefinite extension of
the NPT without conditions. 
Many of the non-nuclear treaty parties believed
that the nuclear weapon states had not met their NPT 
arms control obligations. Of overwhelming
importance was the long failure to achieve a CTBT.
The NPT Review Conferences of 1980 and 1990 had 
failed over this issue and the 1975 and 1985 Review
Conferences essentially papered over profound
differences on the necessity for a CTBT. However,
in the run-up to the 1995 Conference, the United
States abandoned its long held opposition. In
October 1993, the United States spoke during the
United Nations’ consideration of its annual
resolution calling for a CTBT and voted in favour for
the first time, and in 1994 joined other members of
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in negotiating 
a CTBT in earnest.
The US change of policy gave credibility to
Ambassador Graham’s assurances to the leaderships
of countries around the world, such as South Africa, 
Indonesia, Colombia, Mexico, the Philippines,
Egypt, Morocco, the South Pacific Nations and many 
others important to NPT extension, when he told
them that “you don’t need to have leverage on the
nuclear weapon states to meet their obligations, you 
don’t need to adopt the proposal of some who want 
to place restrictive conditions on the continuing life 
of the Treaty, the world community can give itself
the security of a permanent NPT without crippling 
conditions. The United States is committed to the 
CTBT and its other obligations under Article VI.” It 
was on this basis, as reflected in the Principles and 
Objectives on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 
adopted prior to the decision on indefinite extension, 
that an overwhelming majority of the NPT parties 
supported making the NPT permanent, a great step
forward for US interests and for world security. The 
long failure of the United States to ratify the CTBT 
is a serious breach of faith with this decision, gravely
undermining the viability of the NPT. Thus, it is 
most important that the United States ratify the
Disarmament Diplomacy  91 17 Summer  2009
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
   
  
 
    
  
  
  
 
   
   
 
 
   
  
 
  
    
  
 
  
 
  
   
   
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
   
 
    
  
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
     
CTBT in the near future, if at all possible before the 
2010 Review Conference.
The 2005 NPT Review Conference was a 
disaster: for the first time ever the NPT parties were
unable to agree on anything. The United States was 
largely responsible for this by, among other things,
being unwilling to recognize the commitments made 
by the nuclear weapon states in 1995 to secure 
indefinite NPT extension, in particular the CTBT. A 
US failure to ratify the CTBT by the time of the
2010 Review Conference could lead to another “lost” 
Review Conference, seriously jeopardizing the future
of the NPT. By contrast a US ratification would be 
viewed as highly positive by NPT parties and would 
put the nonproliferation regime back on the road 
toward viability after many reverses in recent years.
CTBT entry into force requires more than the
United States, however. Of the further eight states 
necessary for entry into force, China and Israel are
waiting for Washington to act and would likely
follow suit reasonably soon. India agreed to join the
CTBT after its 1998 tests but was let off the hook by 
the 1999 action of the US Senate. US and India 
relations are better now than in 1998, so there should 
be renewed impetus to obtain India’s signature and
ratification after US ratification. Action by India to 
ratify probably would be followed by Pakistan. With
the US, Israel and China in the CTBT there would no 
longer be a reason for Egypt and Indonesia to stay
out. So that would leave Iran and North Korea. Iran 
might be willing to join if only because a failure to
ratify would appear to give the lie to their claim that 
Iran does not seek nuclear weapons but only peaceful
nuclear power. Any other reason Iran might put
forward for staying out would have been removed.
That would leave North Korea, and the outcome
would likely depend on how much pressure China
would be willing to bring to bear. But entry into 
force would be in sight.
Post 1995, many NPT non nuclear weapon states 
are still uncomfortable that they gave away the 
sovereign right to possess a potent weapon to defend 
themselves. Moreover, the NNWS for the most part
comply with IAEA inspections, while the NPT
nuclear weapon states are barely inspected.  This 
tradeoff makes sense to NNWS because they want to 
live in nuclear-free neighbourhoods and on a stable 
earth, but they are nevertheless angry that the NWS 
have not fulfilled their obligations under Article VI
to disarm and reduce the threat of nuclear weapons.
The NNWS asked themselves if they should extend 
the NPT without a time limit without obtaining a 
quid pro quo constraint on NPT nuclear weapon
states.  As the 1995 NPT renewal stood in the
balance on Article VI, the NNWS decided that 
preventing nuclear weapon modernization by halting 
nuclear tests and preventing new states from 
becoming nuclear weapon states was their most 
immediate objective, and so they prioritized holding
the NWS to their commitment to conclude the CTBT
negotiations underway in the CD.
In a letter dated 19 April 1995 from France,
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States
(China agreed later) to the 1995 NPT Review and 
Extension Conference, the NWS coupled a
determination to complete the CTBT with a request
to the NNWS that the NPT provisions be made 
permanent (the quid pro quo):
“We reaffirm our determination to continue to 
negotiate intensively, as a high priority, a universal 
and multilaterally and effectively verifiable
comprehensive nuclear test–ban treaty, and we
pledge our support for its conclusion without delay...
We call upon all States parties to the [NPT] to make
the treaty provisions permanent.  This will be crucial
for the full realization of the goals set out in Article 
VI.”4 
As in 1968, the NNWS in 1995 chose to back
having a strong, durable NPT and thereby gave up
the leverage of holding the treaty hostage over its
extension. In the Statement of Principles and
Objectives on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament that accompanied the resolution 
indefinitely extending the NPT, all NPT parties 
agreed to conclude a CTBT in one year.  The 1995
NPT Review and Extension Conference agreed on
the following objective: 
“The completion by the Conference on 
Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and 
internationally and effectively verifiable
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty no later
than 1996.  Pending the entry into force of a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the nuclear – 
weapon States should exercise utmost restraint.” 5 
After this was agreed, the NNWS fulfilled their
part of the bargain and renewed the NPT without a 
time limit.  Without the CTBT promise, it might
have been necessary to settle for a fixed renewal of 
the NPT, with proposals ranging from 10 to 25 years. 
A ten year NPT would have expired in 2005, when 
the Review Conference failed completely. If the NPT
had been renewed for 25 years, the NPT would be
nearing its expiration in 2020.
By way of comparison: if the US Constitution 
was nearing expiration and had to be renegotiated by
the 50 states, there would likely be chaos and
instability in the United States. Large states like
California might insist on having more power in the 
Senate than smaller states like Wyoming or Rhode
Island.  Such arguments could foreseeably wreck the
careful balances and, once undone, it would be 
difficult if not impossible to renegotiate and achieve
a better US Constitution than the one we have.
Disarmament Diplomacy  91 18 Summer  2009
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
  
   
  
 
 
  
    
   
 
 
   
  
 
 
  
   
  
     
  
 
 
  
 
 
   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
   
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
  
   
  
 
  
    
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
   
  
   
  
 
  
   
 
 
   
  
Verification of the CTBT 
Critics of the CTBT have suggested that the
Treaty would not be verifiable below levels of about
one kiloton, as this was the baseline agreed at the
time that states negotiated to get the most reasonable
and cost-effective monitoring architecture. As
anticipated at the time, verification capabilities have
continued to get better as the system has expanded 
and improved. Seismography can now distinguish
the characteristic signature from a nuclear explosion 
and discriminate between that and the signatures 
from earthquakes, mine-collapses, mini-meteorites,
and ripple-fired chemical explosions.6 
In addition to advances in the IMS monitoring 
technologies, verification is also enhanced by
improvements in the capabilities of civilian seismic 
networks and national technical monitoring systems. 
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study,
Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty concluded that 
“underground nuclear explosions can be reliably
detected and can be identified as explosions, using
IMS data down to a yield of 0.1 kilotons (100 tons)
in hard rock if conducted anywhere in Europe, Asia,
North Africa and North America.”7 Advances in 
regional seismology provide additional confidence.
For some locations (such as Russia’s nuclear test site
at Novaya Zemlya) the use of seismic arrays and 
nearby seismic stations have lowered the detection
threshold to below 0.01 kilotons.  The NAS results
were obtained under criteria that three or more
primary IMS stations must detect the event with a
success probability of 90%. This ignores the
contribution of the 120 IMS auxiliary stations,
which, according to the NAS would lower the
detection threshold by an additional 0.25 to 0.5
magnitude units. This could greatly increase
detection of explosions in hard rock, making it a 
risky proposition for a potential violator to conduct 
an illegal nuclear explosion from 50 tons on
upwards. See Table I for a summary of monitoring
capabilities for eight types of technologies. 
As an example, take the 0.6 kiloton, North– 
Korean explosion (essentially a failed test) on 9
October 2006.8 This explosion was promptly
detected and identified from signals recorded at 31 
seismic stations in Australia, Europe, North America 
and Asia, including 22 IMS stations (10 primary and 
12 auxiliary, when only 60% of IMS seismic stations 
were certified) established by the Preparatory 
Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Organization (CTBTO). The US Geological Survey 
posted a good estimate of the test location five hours
after the explosion occurred. The location was
narrowed to a few square kilometres by David
Albright and Paul Brannon, using commercial 
imagery.9 The 25 May 2009 North Korean
explosion of 2 to 3 kilotons was observed by 61 IMS
seismic stations when 76% were certified (130 of 
170).
Seismic data from underground chemical 
explosions show that far lower yield explosions
would have been detected in the Korean region – in
fact as low as 0.002 kilotons, a factor of 50 below
the 0.1 kiloton NAS monitoring threshold and a
factor of 500 below the nominal one kiloton 
baseline.10 A 0.005 kiloton (5 ton) threshold is not 
applicable everywhere, but it is evidence that 
considerably lower limits can be obtained than
previously assumed, particularly if there is a 
sufficient density of regional seismic stations.
Similarly, the 4 ton blast that shattered the US 
embassy in Kenya and also the 4 ton blast that 
destroyed the Kursk submarine in 2000 were
recorded by 20 seismic stations.11 
Much of this progress is due to the availability of
more data at closer distances.  Regional monitoring
is based on signals that travel via the earth’s crust 
and upper mantle, and have been recorded at 
distances up to about 1,500 kilometre (km). Better
results are obtained with regional monitoring than 
with longer-range or teleseismic stations, which 
measure body waves that travel below the earth’s 
mantle. New algorithms, closer access, and more 
detailed seismic models enhance the ability to 
improve location estimates and better discriminate 
between nuclear tests, earthquakes, chemical 
explosions for mining, or other phenomena. For 
example, analysis of Soviet-era data from
seismographs located at a distance of 500 - 1,500 km
from the Semipalatinsk site in Kazakhstan provided
information on all but two of the 340 tests over one
ton (0.001 kilotons).12 This achievement took place 
with seismographs employing old technology. Newer
broad-band, digital seismographs are much better.
As of July 2009, 247 of the total 337 IMS
facilities were certified (73%), 28 were being tested
but not yet certified (8%), 29 were under
construction (9%), and 33 are in the planning stage 
(10%).  Since over 90% of the IMS facilities are now
certified, operational or under construction, it is
expected that 95% of the IMS network will be
completed in five years. Additional data can be
retrieved quickly from the 120-station auxiliary IMS 
network and from the vast Global Seismic Network
and the International Seismological Centre.  
The major nuclear weapon states are well 
monitored with 32 sites in Russia, 12 in China and 
39 in the United States. The South American cone is
well covered with 23 sites in Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile. The coverage of North Korea is excellent as
well, with 23 sites in China, Japan and South Korea.
The Middle East is covered with 17 sites.  India and 
Pakistan are surrounded with over 40 sites in 
Disarmament Diplomacy  91 19 Summer  2009
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
  
 
 
  
    
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
    
  
  
  
 
 
   
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
   
  
 
  
  
  
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
   
     
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
   
 
  
  
 
   
Australia, Bangladesh, China, Sri Lanka and 
Thailand.  To these assets must be added the many
seismographs not part of the IMS and additional
capability from national intelligence capabilities.
Evasion Scenarios using Cavities
The NAS panel examined 10 evasion scenarios
suggested by the US intelligence community.13 The 
panel concluded that “the only evasion scenarios that 
need to be taken seriously at this time are cavity
decoupling and mine masking.”  On the latter issue, 
member states are requested to notify the CTBTO 
(on a voluntary basis) of chemical explosions over
0.3 kiloton. Seismic patterns from ripple-fired
explosions and infrasound detection can discriminate
between explosions and earthquakes. The most
commonly cited concern during the Senate debate
was cavity decoupling, which is the use of a cave, 
underground cavern or other form of cavity to muffle
the seismic wave from a nuclear explosion.14 No 
country is known to have fully decoupled a nuclear 
explosion in a cavity that was created for that
purpose. An explosion is “fully” decoupled if the
cavity is large enough to reduce the nuclear blast
pressure on the cavity wall below a critical level (the
cavity radius to do this must be larger than 25 meters
times the yield in kilotons to the 1/3 power). The 
only “fully” decoupled nuclear test had a small yield 
of 0.4 kiloton that was reduced by a factor of 70 at 1
Hz. The decoupling factor is reduced at higher 
frequencies, for example 10 at 10 Hz, which is more 
accessible to regional seismographs.
During the 1999 Senate debate, then Senate 
Majority Leader Trent Lott mistakenly claimed that a 
70 kiloton explosion in a cavity could be hidden 
from IMS monitoring. To do this would require a
deep cavity with a 200 meter diameter (equivalent to
a 50 storey building) with an area of 0.13 square km
at a depth of one km. No such cavity has ever been 
constructed and it would be essentially impossible to
construct one or to find and use a hypothetical cavity 
of this kind with sufficient secrecy to hide a test. 
The NAS panel determined that an explosion in a 
cavity “cannot be confidently hidden if its yield is 
larger than 1 or 2 kiloton”.15 The prospect that a 
country could cheat undetected fails to take into 
account that nowadays arrays of seismographs and
other seismic capabilities can detect and identify 
many events that take place more than 2,000 km
away with yields considerably less than one kiloton.
And such claims ignore the advances in regional 
seismology and the venting of radionuclides, which 
would be detected by other monitoring technologies
linked into the IMS.  The panel noted that if an 
inexperienced state wanted to reduce the risk of 
detection, “it would probably try to limit test yields
to 0.1 kiloton or less”.16 
Military Significance, or What Could be
Gained by Cheating? 
The principal risk that needs to be avoided is that
a country under the CTBT could alter the strategic 
balance between it and the United States. The NAS 
study concluded that it would be very difficult for
states with less nuclear testing experience, such as 
India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and Iraq, to meet
the required conditions to avoid detection by testing 
in a cavity at one kiloton or less. It is far easier to test 
in the 10 kiloton region without a specific yield, than
to test at a specific 1 kiloton yield or less. The NAS 
study concluded that “Countries with lesser prior test 
experience and/or design sophistication” would also
lack the sophisticated test-related expertise to obtain
“limited improvement of efficiency and weight of
unboosted fission weapons compared to first– 
generation weapons not needing testing” from tests 
at levels of 0.01 kiloton to 1–2 kilotons.17 
The NAS panel also judged that “States with 
extensive prior test experience [Russia and China]
are the ones most likely to be able to get away with 
any substantial degree of clandestine testing.” Such
states could, with difficulty, potentially validate
designs for unboosted one kiloton fission weapons in 
a cavity. At the same time, it must be taken into
account that very low yield tests by such nuclear 
weapon states would not, by themselves, materially
change the strategic balance. A 1995 JASON panel 
concluded that testing at 0.5 kilotons would provide 
only minimal gains in developing a new weapon
design. Moreover, at a minimum, several clandestine 
tests are needed to change design parameters,
improving the chance of detection.
Effective Verification
The US standard for effective verification of an
arms control treaty was defined during Senate
ratification of the 1988 Intermediate-range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty and the 1991 Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START). During INF Treaty 
ratification hearings, Ambassador Paul Nitze defined 
effective verification as follows: “if the other side
moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any 
militarily significant way, we would be able to detect
such violation in time to respond effectively and 
thereby deny the other side the benefit of the
violation”.18 Effective verification is determined by 
the military significance of the additional nuclear-
weapons capabilities obtained by cheating, beyond
those it had before the treaty was in place.  
It is clearly recognized that treaty violations that
might threaten US national security in a militarily
significant way must be detected in sufficient time. 
Undetected cheating at extremely low yields under 
the CTBT would, at most, provide only limited 
benefits for Russia and China and would not 
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adversely affect the strategic balance.  By contrast, it 
is much more difficult for states with limited testing 
experience to gain significant information at very 
low yield levels.
A worst-case analysis on the consequences of a
treaty breakout was carried out by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee for the Senate ratification for
START I (under Senator Pell, Democrat, Rhode
Island), an approach that was repeated for START II 
ratification (under Senator Helms, Republican, North 
Carolina).19 Those reports concluded that potential 
violations to the START treaties were not militarily 
significant, since even if they cheated, the Soviets
(and then the Russians) would gain little in their
ability to hurt US strategic forces beyond what they 
could do without violating the treaties. These results 
allowed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to 
determine that the two START treaties were 
effectively verifiable, which has been borne out with 
time.
Over the past decade, despite missing some of the
ratifications necessary for the treaty to enter into 
force, the CTBT Organization in Vienna has been far
from idle. The International Monitoring System, with
stations all round the world, is now 90% complete
(73% of the 337 facilities are certified, 8% are in
testing, 9% are under construction, with the 
remaining 10% in the planning phase).  Moreover,
the effective nuclear explosion detection limit is far 
better than the one-kiloton limit that some of the
Treaty’s opponent’s claimed for it at the time of the
ratification vote, by a factor of 10 at 0.1 kilotons.
By any reasonable standards – and certainly, in
accordance with the standards applied by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee when it ratified 
START I – the CTBT is effectively verifiable.
Stockpile Stewardship Program 
The 2006 JASON group concluded that aging of
plutonium is not a significant issue, noting:
“Most primary types have credible minimum
lifetimes in excess of 100 years as regards aging of 
plutonium; those with assessed minimum lifetime of
100 years or less have clear mitigation paths that 
are proposed and/or being implemented...There is no
evidence for void swelling in naturally aged or 
artificially aged plutonium samples over the actual
and accelerated times scales examined to date, and 
good reason to believe it will not occur on times 
scales of interest, if at all.  Systems with large
margins will remain so for greater than 100 years 
with respect to plutonium aging.  Thus, the issue of
plutonium aging is secondary to the issue of
managing margins.”20 
The JASONS recommended measures to increase
performance margins of weapons, such as increasing
tritium content in warheads.21 The NAS panel 
continually asked weapon designers during classified 
briefings on the enduring stockpile whether testing 
was needed to resolve the issue under discussion.
US weapon scientists always responded that testing 
was not needed to solve the issue under discussion.
The NAS panel concluded that a properly run
stockpile stewardship programme is far more 
important than nuclear testing to maintain the 
reliability of warheads:
“It seems to us that the argument to the contrary 
– that is, the argument that improvements in the
capabilities that underpin confidence in the absence 
of nuclear testing will inevitably lose the race with 
the growing needs from an aging stockpile – 
underestimates the current capability for stockpile 
stewardship, underestimates the effects of current 
and likely future rates of progress in improving these
capabilities, and overestimates the role that nuclear
testing ever played (or would be ever likely to play) 
in ensuring stockpile reliability.”22 
These conclusions are consistent with the fact 
that the United States has not needed to test in the 17 
years since it undertook a testing moratorium in
1992.23  Each year the US government has stated that 
it is “confident that the stockpile is safe and reliable,
and there is no requirement at this time for nuclear
tests.”  The annual certification on stockpile
readiness requires the Secretary of Defense (after 
advice from Strategic Command and the military
services) and the Secretary of Energy (after advice 
from the three weapon laboratory directors and the 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
administrator) to determine whether all safety and 
reliability requirements are being met without the
need for nuclear testing.  These reports have always
certified that the stockpile does not need testing for
reasons of safety or reliability.  The NAS panel 
concluded that testing is not needed in future years,
with these caveats: (i) a robust stockpile stewardship 
programme, (ii) no new weapon designs, and (iii) the 
right of the United States to withdraw from the 
CTBT if US leaders decide that nuclear testing is
necessary for defending US national security.
Enduring Stockpile and Safety Issues
The enduring stockpile is currently projected to 
consist of about 5000 warheads (about 50%
operational and 50% in reserve) with seven different
types.  The warheads in the enduring stockpile have 
been tested 150 - 200 times.  The yield on the target
is usually much larger than what is needed for
particular missions, so the only important issues are 
does the weapon explode and is missile accuracy 
sufficient. The United States has not tested each 
warhead type enough times to determine reliability
with high confidence statistics. For example, if we 
assume ten reliability tests were performed and all 
were successful, the reliability evaluation is not 
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100% with 100% confidence, but is framed as a 30% 
chance that reliability is less than 90% and a 10% 
chance that reliability is less than 80%.24 In other 
words, when a few successful tests give the design 
yield, the reliability of a warhead type is defined as
1.0, but without a confidence level. If problems 
arise, the reliability evaluation is reduced somewhat 
arbitrarily.
Since the weapons have been extremely reliable, 
the DOE only dedicated one test per year to examine
the reliability of the ten different types of weapons
already deployed.  Thus, nuclear testing has not 
played a large role in determining our confidence in
the reliability of the weapons in the nuclear arsenal;
it is non-explosive monitoring that has played the 
dominant role in maintaining our confidence in the
reliability of nuclear weapons. The NAS panel
concluded the following on future needs for nuclear
testing:
“The question of whether nuclear testing might
ever be needed to correct problems discovered in 
weapons certification and deployment generated 
some controversy in the 1980s. However it was
shown that almost all of the problems cited in
support of this proposition were either of a kind not
requiring nuclear testing or represented cases where 
testing had been inadequate during development.  In
relating these experiences to the current situation it
is also important to note that the observed failures
all occurred within three years after entry into the 
stockpile. The weapons in today’s active stockpile 
have long passed the age where anomalies in initial
production units are a significant problem.
Furthermore, they are all based on tested designs 
that have taken advantage of lessons learned from
other vintages.” 25 
The main threat to warhead reliability is caused
by non-nuclear components, which are examined
without nuclear-explosive testing.  Problem areas 
that have been uncovered are the following: 
insufficient tritium, faulty tritium bottles, corrosion
of fissile material, degradation of high explosives,
low-temperature performance, vulnerability to 
fratricide neutrons, radar, batteries, fuse switches,
neutron generators, faulty cables, trajectory sensors,
control systems, rocket motors, gas transfer valves,
firing sets, and pilot parachutes.
Experience demonstrates that nuclear weapon
safety is more reliant on avoiding human error than 
on weapon design or testing. Only one serious US
nuclear weapon accident has taken place since 1968.
This took place in 1980 when a wrench fell 80 feet,
fracturing the first stage of a liquid-fuelled Titan 
missile in a silo in Arkansas.  Nine hours later it
exploded, propelling the 9-megatron, W-53 warhead
100 feet onto a neighbouring field.  This accident did 
not spread radioactivity and could not happen now
since all liquid-fuelled missiles have been 
decommissioned.  Over the nuclear weapon era, only
two accidents spread considerable radioactivity, and 
both of these were the result of aeroplane accidents:
at Palomares, Spain (1966) and Thule, Greenland 
(1968).  Practically all (29 of 32) nuclear weapon 
accidents have resulted from aircraft accidents. 
Accidents with aircraft are much less relevant since
aeroplanes no longer routinely carry or fly nuclear 
weapons, unless they are on special alert.  The 
nuclear armed cruise missiles accidentally flown 
across the U.S. in 2007 were not supposed to be on
the bomber that carried them, this was an on the 
ground error.  The least safe nuclear weapons
(liquid-fuelled ICBMs, nuclear artillery and short-
range attack missiles) have been decommissioned.
The safety procedures for submarine weapons have 
been modified to increase safety.  There is a DoD
consensus that there are no significant safety 
problems requiring modifications that need nuclear 
testing. 
The National Security Value of a CTBT
The CTBT has important security value for both
the United States and the international community. 
France, Russia and the United Kingdom ratified the 
CTBT promptly, despite the failure of the US Senate 
to ratify the treaty to date.  China has practically 
completed its ratification procedures but appears to 
be waiting for the US to ratify. 
Without a CTBT, China could, for example, test
miniaturized hydrogen bombs for a MIRVed ICBM,
and so start a new nuclear arms race.  Without a 
CTBT, Russia’s military would push to renew
nuclear testing.  Without a CTBT, the political-legal 
barrier to weaponization would be much smaller. 
Without a CTBT there would be greater disharmony 
among the family of nations, and less capability to 
unite against the dangers of proliferation, making it
even more difficult to prevent nuclear weapons 
programmes in Iran, North Korea and other nations.
For these reasons, the CTBT is a national security
issue for the US and the now 188 other NPT parties.
The CTBT will make the world safer and this 
includes nations under the US nuclear umbrella, such 
as Japan, South Korea and Germany.
The National Academy panel examined three 
scenarios regarding the future of the CTBT, with
emphasis on seven nations: Russia, China, India,
Pakistan, North Korea, Iraq and Iran. The scenarios 
were: a fully implemented CTBT with compliance; a 
CTBT where one or more states sought to violate 
their obligations and conduct clandestine tests using 
evasion techniques to avoid IMS detection; and no 
CTBT. The NAS panel concluded the following:
“The worse-case scenario under a no–CTBT regime
poses far bigger threats to US security interests – 
sophisticated nuclear weapons in the hands of many 
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more adversaries – than the worst-case scenario of
clandestine testing in a CTBT regime, within the 
constraints posed by the monitoring system.”26 
General John Shalikashvili, former Chair of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, examined the net benefit of the
CTBT by examining all aspects, including political
ramifications for two worlds, with and without a
CTBT, concluding the following:
“I believe that it is very much in our national 
interest to secure these benefits through entry into 
force of the Test Ban Treaty.  If this opportunity is
lost, the United States’ ability to lead an effective
global campaign against nuclear proliferation will 
be severely damaged.” 27 
General Shalikashvili’s report suggested a
mechanism for CTBT ratification in which the
United States would “commit to conducting an
intensive joint review of the Test Ban Treaty’s net
value for national security ten years after US
ratification, and at ten-year intervals thereafter… If, 
after these steps, grave doubts remain about the 
Treaty’s net value for US national security, the
President, in consultation with Congress, would be
prepared to withdraw from the Test Ban Treaty
under the ‘supreme national interests’ clause.”28 
Conclusion 
It is widely believed that the United States will
not test a nuclear weapon because both China and 
Russia would quickly respond with multiple nuclear
tests, leading to a new arms race. In addition, the 
prevailing wisdom in Washington is that US efforts 
to halt nuclear proliferation would be greatly
damaged if the US tested. Thus, the United States is
already operating under CTBT-like constraints,
while not gaining the full benefits that would follow
from the CTBT being in force.  It would be in US
interests to ratify the CTBT for many reasons.  In the 
unlikely case that the US found itself needing to test 
for serious reasons, then we have the option to
withdraw from the CTBT for national security 
reasons.
As discussed above, without a CTBT, China 
could test miniaturized hydrogen bombs for a 
MIRVed ICBM, starting a new nuclear arms race.
Some nuclear weaponeers in Russia would be keen 
to renew nuclear testing if not constrained by the 
CTBT, which Russia has ratified but could ditch if
US ratification were to be subject to further
significant delays. As long as the nuclear test ban 
holds, could-be nuclear-armed nations such as Iran
would not be able to proof test the more advanced,
smaller nuclear warheads designs that are needed in 
order to deliver nuclear weapons by missile. The
CTBT helps block new nuclear threats from
emerging, thereby enhancing US and global security.
Without a CTBT, there would be less unity among 
nations to address nuclear programs in Iran, North 
Korea and other nations. Without a CTBT, there 
would be a smaller political-legal barrier to
weaponization. Without a CTBT there would be 
disharmony among the family of nations, and less 
capability to unite against the dangers of
proliferation.  US ratification for the CTBT will 
restore US global leadership and strengthen
international support for the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty, the bedrock of all efforts to stop
the spread of nuclear weapons. For these reasons, the
CTBT is a national security issue for the US and the
188 other NPT parties.  A one-sided NPT will not 
survive forever.  The security of the United States
and global non-proliferation would be enhanced by
the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty and it is now being degraded by a failure to
ratify.
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Table 1. CTBT monitoring capabilities
Method Description IMS Assets (when complete) 
Seismic NAS concluded that explosions above 0.1 kt
in hard rock can be detected in Asia, Europe, 
North America and North Africa.
Tests in cavities can be detected above 1-2 kt
for advanced nuclear weapon states, with risk
of venting and excursion yields.  This limit is
perhaps 0.1 kt for new nuclear nations.
IMS will use 50 primary and 120 
auxiliary seismic stations.  Arrays of 
seismographs and regional seismographs 
can obtain lower threshold yields. In 
addition, thousands of non-IMS stations 
have data that could trigger an on-site
inspection.
Hydroacoustic NAS concluded that explosions above a few
kg can be detected in Southern Hemisphere, 
and above 1 ton for all oceans. 
IMS will use six hydrophone arrays and 
five T-phase monitoring stations.
Infrasound NAS concluded that explosions above 1 kt in 
the atmosphere can be detected, and above 0.5 
kt over continents.  
IMS will use 60 infrasound monitoring
stations. 
Radionuclide NAS concludes that explosions above 0.1–1 
kt can be detected to identify the event as a
nuclear explosion.  The 0.6 kt North Korean
test was detected at 7,000 km distance.
IMS will use 80 particulate monitoring
stations, and 40 of these will also detect
radioxenon.  NTM sensors can be placed
on airplanes for close approaches to 
suspected test sites.
InSAR
(Interferometric 
Synthetic Aperture
Radar) 
InSAR can measure subsidence as low as 0.2-
0.5 cm in many locations, with yields above 1 
kt at 500 m depth.  InSAR can determine 
locations to 100 m. 
United States has four classified SAR
satellites. Europe, Canada and Japan 
sell unclassified SAR data for as low as 
$1,000 each.
On-Site Inspections
(OSI)
Any CTBT party can request an OSI, which 
needs 30 of 51 votes in the Executive Council.
Photos and radioactivity obtained by air 
and ground.  Mini seismic arrays can 
observe aftershocks.  Magnetic 
anomalies, SAR, soil data obtained with 
GPS locations. 
Confidence-
Building Measures 
After CTBT enters into force, nuclear weapon
states could locate more sensors at test sites to
lower thresholds further. 
Close-in sensors could detect seismic,
infrasound, electromagnetic pulse,
radionuclide and other data indicative of
a test.
National Technical 
Means
US NTM technologies have considerable
reach and precision.
NTM sensors are located in space, in the 
atmosphere, on the ground, in the oceans 
and underground. 
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